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No. 20080937 
I N THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
J U L I E A N N OLSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH'S REPLY BRIEF 
The Utah Department of Health (DOH) files this Reply Brief in 
support of its interlocutory appeal from the denial of its motion for 
summary judgment. 
REPLY ARGUMENTS 
I. The statute 's plain language controls. 
The district court created an additional definition of "demotion" to 
include "disciplinary transfers" that have no accompanying reduction in 
the employee's current actual wage. The district court's construction is 
not supported by the plain statutory language. The Legislature defined 
"demotion" as a "disciplinary action resulting in a reduction of an 
employee's current actual wage/' Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)(a) (West 
Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). And despite the district court's 
construction and Olson's arguments, subsection (b)(i) does not define the 
actions that constitute a demotion, instead tha t section makes clear the 
actions not constituting a demotion.1 
By statutory definition, a demotion requires a reduction in current 
actual wage; that means a reduction in hourly pay, nothing more or 
less. The term "current" is defined as "occurring in or existing at the 
present time." Merriam'Webster Online Dictionary(2009), available at 
http7/www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary. "Actual" is defined as 
"existing in act and not merely potentially, existing or occurring at the 
time." Id. And "wage" is defined as "a payment, usually of money, for 
labor or services usually according to contract and on an hourly, daily or 
piecework basis." Id. It is undisputed tha t DOH restored Olson's 
current actual wage. Under the ordinary and accepted meaning of each, 
crucial statutory term, Olson was not demoted because she suffered no 
1
 (b) "Demotion" does not mean-
(i) a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to 
another position without a reduction in the current 
actual wage; 
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reduction in her current actual wage. The district court erred by not 
granting DOH's motion for summary judgment. 
Courts turn to other methods of statutory construction only when 
the statutory language is ambiguous. State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT App. 
538, If 9, 127 P.3d 1252; see also Housing Auth. v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 
j^ 10, 44 P.3d 724. Because there is no ambiguity, this Court's inquiry 
should end with the statute 's plain language. 
Moreover, this Court should decline to apply exceptions to the 
plain language rule. Contrary to Olson's assertions, applying the plain 
language rule to the definition of demotion here, leads to neither absurd 
results nor a contravention of expressed legislative intent. The absurd 
result exception to the plain meaning rule is narrowly limited. State ex 
relZ.C, 2007 UT 54, % 12, 165 P.3d 1206, 1209. Utah's appellate courts 
recognize that it is not their duty to assess the wisdom of the statutory 
scheme. Instead, a court's task is to "interpret the words used by the 
legislature, not to correct or revise them. When the words are clear, 
however incongruous they may appear in policy application, the court 
will interpret them as written, leaving to the legislature the task of 
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making corrections when warranted." State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App. 
304, f 11, 169P.3d778. 
In sum, the absurd result exception "applies only where the result 
is so absurd tha t 'Congress could not possiblyhave intended' it." State 
exrelZ.C, 2007 UT 54 at f 12 (quoting Pub. Citizens v. United States 
Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (l989)(Kennedy, J., concurring)) 
(emphasis in original). Here, the Legislature intended an employee to 
be demoted only when the employee suffers a reduction in current 
actual wage. The 2006 statutory amendment makes that intent clear. 
If the Legislature intended other actions to constitute demotions it 
could have so stated. For example, prior to the amendment, this Court 
found that an employment action was a demotion if it resulted in "less 
status, fewer responsibilities, a lower pay range, and will ultimately 
result in commensurately lower retirement benefits" even if the grievant 
suffered "no immediate loss of pay." Draughon v. Dep't of Fin. Inst, 
1999 UT App. 42, If 10, 975 P.2d 935. If the Legislature intended that 
result, it could have codified the Draughon decision, or left the term 
demotion undefined. It did neither, and instead, used a more limited 
definition. If tha t definition is unwise policy, it is for the Legislature to 
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fix. Ultimately, the absurd result exception to the plain language rule 
does not apply to this case. 
The plain meaning of demotion also does not contravene the 
Legislature's goals as set forth in the act. Section 67-19-3.1(2) does not 
apply here because the "fair treatment" language applies only to claims 
of discrimination based on membership in protected classes. The 
section provides for "fair t reatment of applicants and employees in all 
aspects of human resource administration without regard to race, color, 
religion, sex, national origin, political affiliation, age, or disability, and 
with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights as 
citizens." Olson has never claimed that DOH took action against her 
because of her membership in a protected class. That section simply 
has no application here. The demotion definition does not contravene 
any expressed legislative intent.2 
2
 Olson implies that an employee can never challenge an 
employment action that has no accompanying reduction in current 
actual wage. That is not true. Employment actions that are believed to 
be illegal can be challenged with the aid of the Utah Antidiscrimination 
and Labor Division, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
and federal and state courts under Title VII, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, and Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, and other federal and state laws. 
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For the first time here, Olson argues that DOH unfairly caused 
her to pay attorney fees. Olson failed to make tha t argument before the 
district court, and the record does not support it. And, as Olson 
acknowledges in a footnote, the CSRB cannot award attorney fees as 
part of a grievance. Furthermore, the argument supports neither the 
district court's improper creation of an additional definition of demotion 
nor the concomitant expansion of CRSB jurisdiction. 
H. Draughon has been superceded by statute. 
DOH agrees that the Draughon case has limited applicability 
here? the controlling statute has changed. But the Draughon decision is 
illustrative because it demonstrates the Legislature's intent by 
inclusion of the express definition of demotion. The Draughon court 
found no statutory support for DHRM's definition of demotion; the Act 
did not draw the distinction between demotion and involuntary transfer 
found in the DHRM rule. Id. at Tffl 10-11. The Legislature rejected the 
court's definition and defined the term consistent with the original 
DHRM rule. Thus, Draughon was overruled in so far as it was 
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superceded by statute. Because the controlling statutory language is 
different, Draughon has no application here and can neither be affirmed 
nor overruled. 
CONCLUSION 
For an employment action to be a demotion, the employee must 
suffer a reduction in current actual wage. Here, the district court 
improperly ignored the statute 's plain language when it denied DOH's 
motion for summary judgment. This Court should correct the district 
court's statutory construction and reverse that court's denial of DOH's 
summary judgment motion. 
Dated t h i s 5 \ day of March, 2009. 
PEGGY W STONE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner Utah 
Department of Health 
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